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Abstract In this paper, a novel methodology is proposed
to solve a cooperative multi-depot vehicle routing problem.
We establish a mathematical model for multi-owner VRP
in which each owner (i.e. player) manages single or mul-
tiple depots. The basic idea consists of offering an option
that owners cooperatively manage the VRP to save their
costs. We present cooperative game theory techniques for
cost saving allocations which are obtained from various
coalitions of owners. The methodology is illustrated with a
numerical example in which different coalitions of the
players are evaluated along with the results of cooperation
and cost saving allocation methods.
Keywords Multi depot vehicle routing problem 
Cooperation  Coalition  Cooperative game theory 
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Introduction
Vehicle routing problem (VRP) is faced each day by
thousands of companies and organizations which are
engaged in delivery and collection of goods or people
(Crevier et al. 2007). Basic components of the VRP are
road networks, customers, depots and vehicles. The VRPs
can be categorized, depending on the objectives and con-
straints occurring in many transportation logistics and
distribution systems.
A basic version of the VRP is the capacitated VRP
(CVRP) in which each vehicle has a known capacity and
two other versions of CVRP are symmetric and asym-
metric. Lots of new constraints are added on the route
construction and made practical applications of the VRP
(Toth and Vigo 2002). For example, Split-Delivery VRP
(SDVRP) is a relaxation of the VRP in which the same
customer can be served by different vehicles if it reduces
the overall costs. It saves the total distance traveled as well
as the number of required vehicles by allowing split
deliveries (Jin et al. 2008). Hasani-Goodarzi and Tavak-
koli-Moghaddam (2012) studied a split vehicle routing
problem (SVRP) with capacity constraint for the multi-
product cross-docks to determine the best vehicle routes
and the optimal number of the utilized vehicles. By
developing the CVRP, a VRP with Time Windows
(VRPTW) can be obtained for which the service to each
customer must start within a certain time window and the
vehicle must remain at the customer’s location throughout
the service. Delivery of food or newspaper is a simple
example for the VRPTW. Another extension of the CVRP
is VRP with Backhauls (VRPB) in which the customers
may demand or return some goods. The customers are
divided into two groups: line haul and back haul customers.
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delivered while a given quantity of products must be
picked up from back haul customers. The next VRP model
is the VRP with Pickup and Delivery (VRPPD). The
vehicles have the responsibility for delivering the goods to
customers and picking the goods up at the customer loca-
tions. Another well-known generalization of the VRP is
Multi-Depot VRP (MDVRP). In the MDVRP, there are
several depots instead of just one depot and every customer
is visited by a vehicle based at one of the several existing
depots, while every vehicle route must start and end at the
same depot. By presentation of the initial VRP and basic
models introduced above, many researchers studied algo-
rithms and models for different versions of the VRP.
With starting of economic depression and consequently
adverse effects on global trade, the transportation markets
particularly container sea transportation companies have
been exposed to recession. The container sea transportation
agents believe that these companies are able to integrate
their resources to provide more services and get rid of this
economic crisis (Sterzik et al. 2012). In this way, by
expanding the VRP in transportation of containers (Vidovic´
et al. 2011) the companies can cooperate with each other.
One way for such a collaboration is when the companies
are in the same port use the vehicles of each other; or the
companies located in different ports use the capacity of
vessels of each other. Therefore, the CoMDVRP can be
used for this kind of problem that enables companies
reduce the costs.
Logistic costs and especially transportation costs often
constitute a large part of the operational costs in compa-
nies. One solution to reduce these costs is cooperation
among the logistic companies. The cooperative game the-
ory (CGT) can be adopted for modeling the cooperation
among the companies. Cooperative games are concerned
with distribution of the cooperation benefits when the
players cooperate. Most applications of the CGT are in
scheduling, cost saving, negotiation and bargaining (Barron
2013). A cooperative game actually considers that the
players may choose to cooperate by forming some coali-
tions. In the coalitions, the players might be lucky to
receive greater benefits than they could gain individually
on their own. Then, the players should allocate the benefits
among each other. Now the key question is how the total
extra benefits (or cost saving) should be fairly distributed
among them. We adopt some well-known CGT methods
such as Shapley value, s value, and least core to address
this question.
The outline of this paper is as follows. The related lit-
erature is reviewed in ‘‘Literature review’’ section. ‘‘Pr-
erequisites and assumptions of MDVRP’’ section defines
the prerequisites and assumptions of the proposed model.
The model formulation of the MDVRP is discussed in
‘‘Model formulation for MDVRP (non-cooperation
situation)’’ section. Then, in ‘‘Formulation of vehicle
routing problem for coalition of players’’ section the
mathematical method of the CoMDVRP is introduced.
Afterwards, cooperative techniques for cost saving allo-
cation are described in ‘‘Cooperative techniques for cost
saving allocation’’ section. A numerical example is also
shown in ‘‘Numerical Example for Cost saving methods in
cooperative VRP’’ section and finally, some concluding
remarks are made in ‘‘Conclusion and further research’’
section.
Literature review
Multi-depot vehicle routing problem
A basic version of the vehicle routing problem that is
defined under capacity and route length restrictions is
called capacitated VRP (CVRP). In this problem, each
vehicle has a capacity that is known, so loading the vehicle
more than its capacity is not allowed.
Variant model of VRP obtained by generalization of the
classical VRP (Cordeau et al. 2007). An extension of VRP
is MDVRP that is studied in this paper. MDVRP deals with
routing of several vehicles from different depots. Mathe-
matical programming models of the MDVRP have been
developed by several researches. Crevier et al. (2007)
presented an extension of the MDVRP that vehicles may
use the intermediate depots along their route to become
full. Ray et al. (2014) worked out a new integer linear
programming model, called multi-depot split-delivery
vehicle routing problem (MDSDVRP) which allows
establishing depot locations and routes for serving the
customer demands within the same objective function.
Aras et al. (2011) proposed two mixed-integer linear pro-
gramming formulations for the selective MDVRP that are
extensions of the classical MDVRP in which each visit to a
broker is associated with a gross profit and a purchase price
to be paid to take the cores back. Wasner and Zapfel (2004)
investigated the necessity of developing a VRP with con-
sidering the number and locations of hubs and depots and
their assigned service areas. Karakati and Podgorelec
(2014) optimized an extension of the classical VRP by
adding multiple depots. Kang et al. (2000) designed a least
costly schedule for MDVRP to minimize transportation
costs.
Ho et al. (2008) introduced the MDVRP as an NP-hard
problem and developed two hybrid genetic algorithms
(HGAs) for solving it. Contardo and Martinelli (2014)
formulated the MDVRP using a vehicle-flow and a set-
partitioning formulation presented a new exact method for
the MDVRP under capacity and route length constraints.
Ray et al. (2014) stated a multi-depot logistics delivery
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problem including the depot selection and shared com-
modity delivery. They mentioned that the MDSDVRP is
suitable for multi-depot, multi-vehicle and split delivery
problem. Liu et al. (2010) proposed a mathematical pro-
gramming model of the multi-depot CVRP with the
objective of minimizing movements of empty vehicles.
They focused on full truckloads in transportation. Surekha
et al. (2011) presented a formulation and solution for
MDVRP using Genetic Algorithms. Salhi et al. (2014)
proposed an MILP formulation for the MDVRP with
heterogeneous vehicle fleet and designed a variable
neighborhood search (VNS) algorithm for the problem.
Prescott-Gagnon et al. (2014) developed different heuris-
tics for MDVRP in an oil delivery industry. Montoya et al.
(2014) presented a complete review on scientific literature
of MDVRP. They comprehensively analyzed the single-
objective and multi-objective MDVRPs and their solution
algorithms. In this paper, we establish a mathematical
programming model for the MDVRP when the depot
owners cooperate with each other.
Cooperative game theory
The cooperative game theory is defined as ‘‘A theory which
is concerned primarily with coalitions of groups of players
who coordinate their actions to reach more benefits.’’
(Branzei et al. 2008). Several researchers have adopted
CGT for modeling cooperation of logistic companies.
Lozano et al. (2013) introduced a mathematical program-
ming model to measure the benefits of merging the trans-
portation demands from different companies. The joint
transportation costs of the companies are reduced because
of using larger vehicles and increased number of the con-
nected trips. They illustrated the model with an example in
which different cooperative game solution concepts are
used. Frisk et al. (2010) studied the collaboration between
logistic companies in the forest industries. They investi-
gated a number of sharing mechanisms including Shapley
value, nucleolus, separable and non-separable costs, sha-
dow prices and volume weights. Hafezalkotob and Makui
(2015) introduced a stochastic mathematical programming
model for a multiple-owner graph problem. They used
methods based on the CGT to show that the collaboration
among independent owners of a logistic network can
maintain a reliable maximum flow. McCain (2008) focused
on the cooperative games in collaborating organizations
and analyzed how these games expand the organization and
increase its profit.
The methods of CGT may be adopted for allocating the
cost saving to cooperating companies. Using CGT, Charles
and Hansen (2008) suggested a theoretical cost saving
framework for global cost minimization and cost saving
assignment in an enterprise network. They showed that the
proposed cost allocations obtained via the activity based
costing technique is rational and stable. Vanovermeire and
Sorensen (2014) dealt with the cooperation among shippers
and stated that the cooperation between shippers is a proper
way to increase the performance. They pointed out that the
cooperation reduces the costs of distribution and delivery
but this reduction will depend on the flexibility of the
companies for delivery of goods. They used the Nucleolus
and the Shapley value methods for this purpose. Lehoux
et al. (2009) have worked on a variety of cooperation
techniques in logistic networks including the Shapley
value; Nucleolus and shadow prices. Engevall et al. (1998)
investigated cost allocation methods for a traveling sales-
man game according concept of traveling salesman
problem.
The current paper is closely related to those of Wang
and Kopfer (2015), and Lozano et al. (2013). Wang and
Kopfer (2015) considered horizontal coalitions among
freight forwarders to enhance operational efficiency. The
proposed collaborative transportation planning enable
forwarders to fulfill customers’ needs with lower costs.
However, they studied neither VRP nor CGT methods.
Lozano et al. (2013) investigated the cost savings of
different logistic companies that may be achieved when
they merge their transportation requirements using the
CGT. In a MDVRP, we consider that the depots are
managed by a set of owners. The owners of each depot
are regarded as players, who like to coordinate with other
players (owners) to reduce their transportation costs. The
minimum transportation cost is obtained in different
coalitions by solving the CoMDVRP for the coalitions.
We calculate the cost saving and synergy of each coali-
tion and then we use methods of CGT for cost saving
allocation. In summary, we investigate how the coordi-
nation among the players (owners of depots) in the
MDVRP gives them this opportunity to minimize the total
transportation cost and how they can fairly share the cost
saving of cooperation among themselves using the CGT
techniques.
Research gap
To the best of authors’ knowledge, no research was found
that considers the cooperative VRP among different play-
ers. Therefore, there are two main contributions in this
study with regard to MDVRP. First, we develop a coop-
erative approach for MDVRP. We study how the cooper-
ation among the multiple owners of depots gives them the
opportunity to reduce the costs of transportation. The cost
savings indicate effectiveness (synergy) of owners’ coop-
eration. The cost saving of cooperation is quantified by a
new mathematical programming model for coalitions of
owners. Second, we propose several methods of CGT to
J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:271–286 273
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address the problem of allocating coalition cost saving to
the cooperating owners.
Prerequisites and assumptions of MDVRP
In a classical VRP, there is only one depot. However,
MDVRP is a problem for specifying the routes in which a
set of customers are served by several vehicles from mul-
tiple depots. As shown in Fig. 1, in a non-cooperative
MDVRP, each depot should serve its own customers.
However, in cooperative situation, depots can serve the
customers of partners. The cooperation among the depots
reduces the route length of the vehicles. Consequently the
total transportation cost may decrease as a result of the
cooperation. The problem of each coalition can be ana-
lyzed by the CoMDVRP.
Assumptions
In a MDVRP, the number and location of the depots are
predetermined. The location of each customer is known
and the demands are deterministic. The demand of each
customer should be fulfilled. Each player owns one depot
only with only one vehicle The vehicles are not necessarily
identical and each vehicle starts and finishes at the same
depot, while each route begins and ends at the same depot.
The capacity restrictions for the vehicles are considered.
The total demand on each route is smaller than or equal to
the capacity of the vehicle assigned to that route. Each
customer is served by exactly one vehicle. Most remark-
able is that the players are rational. Note that the aim of
routing is to minimize the number of routes without des-
ecrating the capacity constraints.
Notations
Before description of the objective functions and model,
the sets, indices, parameters and decision variables are
explained.
Sets
I The set of all depots;
J The set of all customers;
K The set of all vehicles;
P The set of all players (i.e. the owners of depots).
Indices
i The index of depots;
j The index of customers;
k The index of routs;
p The index of players (i.e. owners of depots).
Parameters
N The number of customers;
Cij The travel cost spent to go from point i to j, i,
j 2 I [ J;
Vi The maximum throughput at depot i;
dj The demand of customer j;
Qk The capacity of vehicle (route) k.
Decision variables
xijk :




1; if customer j is served by depot i
0; otherwise

Ulk the auxiliary variable for sub-tour elimination con-
straint in route k and l 2 J.Fig. 1 Framework of CoMDVRP
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Model formulation for MDVRP (non-cooperation
situation)
This section presents a linear model for the MDVRP with
the mentioned notations. Each player (owner) p 2 P min-




















xijk Qk; 8k 2 K ð3Þ











xijk  1; 8 k 2 K; ð6Þ
X
j2J




ðxiuk þ xujkÞ 1; 8i 2 I; j 2 J; k 2 K ð8Þ
xijk 2 0; 1gf ; 8i 2 I; j 2 J; k 2 K ð9Þ
zij 2 0; 1g; 8 i 2 I; j 2 Jf ð10Þ
Ulk  0; 8 l 2 J; k 2 K ð11Þ
The objective function (1) is to minimize sum of the total
transportation cost for the vehicles. Constraint set (2)
guarantees that each customer will be visited exactly once,
while constraint set (3) states the capacity for a set of
vehicles. Constraint set (4) is the sub-tour elimination
condition, where the flow conservation is expressed by
Constraint set (5). Constraint set (6) means that each route
can be served at most once. Constraint set (7) ensures the
capacity of the depots and constraint set (8) specifies that a
customer can be assigned to a depot only if there is a route
from that depot going through that customer. Constraint
sets (9) and (10) represent the binary requirements on the
decision variables. The auxiliary variables Ulk taking pos-
itive values are declared in Constraint set (11).
Formulation of vehicle routing problem
for coalition of players
A new method is proposed here that minimizes sum of the
total transportation cost for the vehicles of a coalition. We
assume that there are multiple players (owners of depots)
that manage some depots. The players cooperate using the
vehicles of each other (coalition members) with the aim of
minimizing their transportation cost. Thus, by solving the
CoMDVRP for a coalition of players, the assignment of
customers to depots of the coalition are planned such that
the total transportation cost of the coalition is minimized.
Coalition m (from of 2N - 1 possible coalitions which N is
the number of player) is denoted by Sm( P). All sets,




I Sm½  The set of all depots for coalition Sm;
J Sm½  The set of all customers for coalition Sm;
K Sm½  The set of all vehicles for coalition Sm.
Indices
i The depot index;
j The customer index;
k The route index;
m The coalition index.
Parameters
N Sm½  The number of customers in coalition Sm;
Cij½Sm The travel cost spent to go from point i toj under
coalition Sm situation i, j 2 I [ J;
Vi The maximum throughput at depot i;
dj The demand of customer j;
Qk½Sm The maximum capacity of vehicle (route) k.
Decision variables
xijk½Sm :
1; if i immediately preceeds j on route k in coalition Sm;
0; otherwise ;
(
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zij Sm½  :
1; if customer j is served by depot i in coalition Sm;
0; otherwise ;
(
Ulk Sm½  the auxiliary variable for sub-tour elimination con-
straint in route k for coalition Sm and l 2 J½sm.
Model formulation for CoMDVRP
This section presents a model for the CoMDVRP consid-
ering interactions among owners as follows:
Min TCðSmÞ ¼
X
i2I Sm½ [J Sm½ 
X
j2I Sm½ [J Sm½ 
X
k2K Sm½ 





i2I Sm½ [J Sm½ 





i2I Sm½ [J Sm½ 
xijk Sm½ 
Qk Sm½  ; 8 k 2 K Sm½  ð14Þ
Ulk Sm½ 
 Ujk Sm½  þ N Sm½ xijk Sm½  N  1; 8 l; j 2 J Sm½ ; k
2 K Sm½ 
ð15Þ
X
i2I Sm½ [J Sm½ 
xijk Sm½  
X
i2I Sm½ [J Sm½ 
xjik Sm½  ¼ 0;






xijk Sm½   1; 8 k 2 K Sm½  ð17Þ
X
j2J Sm½ 
dizij Sm½  Vi; 8 i 2 I Sm½  ð18Þ
 zij Sm½  þ
X
u2I Sm½ [J Sm½ 
ðxiuk Sm½  þ xujk Sm½ Þ  1;






xijk Sm½  ¼ 1; 8 i 2 I ð20Þ
xijk Sm½  þ xj0i0k Sm½   1; 8i 2 I½Sm; i 6¼ i
0
; j 2 J½Sm; k 2 K½Sm
ð21Þ
xijk Sm½  2 0; 1gf ; 8 i 2 I Sm½ ; j 2 J Sm½ ; k 2 K Sm½  ð22Þ
zij Sm½  2 0; 1f g; 8 i 2 I Sm½ ; j 2 J Sm½  ð23Þ
Uj0k Sm½   0; 8 j0 2 J Sm½ ; k 2 K Sm½  ð24Þ
The constraints of this model are developed from the pre-
vious model, and two new constraints are added as well.
The main objective of Function (12) is to minimize sum of
the total transportation cost for the vehicles of coalition Sm.
Constraint set (13) guarantees that in any coalitions each
customer will be visited exactly once by the existing
vehicles. Constraint set (14) states the capacity for a set of
vehicles of coalition Sm. Constraint set (15) is the new sub-
tour elimination constraint set and the flow conservation is
expressed in Constraint (16). Constraint set (17) means that
each route can be used at most once in a coalition, while
Constraint set (18) ensures capacity for the depots of
coalition. Constraint set (19) specifies that a customer can
be assigned to a depot only if there is a route from that
depot going through that customer. Constraint set (20)
restricts assignment of each customer to exactly one
vehicle route and Constraint set (21) ensures that the route
starts from a depot does not end to another depot. Con-
straint sets (22) and (23) denote the binary requirements on
the decision variables. The auxiliary variables Ujk taking
positive values are declared in constraint set (24).
The above model computes the total cost by determining
the best route according to coalition Sm. For solving the
problem, firstly, each player is considered independently
that is a common MDVRP. Then, the model is solved again
considering the coalitions of two players, three players and
so on. When the optimal objective function for any coali-
tional scenario is smaller than sum of the individual opti-
mal objective function, the players have the incentive to
coordinate with each other. It means that the following





The cost savings of coalition Sm is denoted by CS({Sm})




TCðfpgÞ  TCðSmÞ: ð26Þ
Cost saving CS({Sm}) represents the difference between
sum of the individual objective function and that of the
objective function of coalition Sm.
These cost savings can be either higher or lower,
depending on the synergy between owners in different





Now, two numerical examples (symmetric and asymmetric
examples) will be addressed to test the cooperative VRP. In
both numerical examples, four companies were considered
which serve some specific customers. The companies
which are in fact the players are owners of depots and are
illustrated by P = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Each player owns one
depot with only one vehicle. The customers of each depot
276 J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:271–286
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(i.e. players) are illustrated by D1 = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5},
D2 = {c6, c7, c8, c9, c10}, D3 = {c11, c12, c13, c14, c15},-
D4 = {c16, c17, c18, c19, c20} for symmetric example and
D1 = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}, D2 = {c6, c7, c8, c9}, D3 -
= {c10, c11, c12, c13}, D4 = {c14, c15, c16} for asymmetric
example, respectively. Maximum throughputs at depots are
V1 = V2 = V3 = V4 = 200 for symmetric and for asym-
metric are V1 = 220, V2 = 200, V3 = 210, and V4 = 195.
Meanwhile, each company has one vehicle which in
symmetric example has the same capacity Qk = 220 and in
asymmetric example capacity of vehicles are Q1 = 240,
Q2 = 200, Q3 = 210, and Q4 = 195. Figure 2 depicts the
framework of these examples. Each depot and their cus-
tomers are shown in the same color. The travel costs spent
to go from point i to j and the demand of each customer are
shown in Tables 1 and 2, and the demand of each customer
are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
The model of CoMDVRP (12)–(24) is first solved for
each possible coalition of players Sm:{1},{2},{3},{4},{1,
2},{1, 3},{1, 4},{2, 3},{2, 4},{3, 4}{1, 2, 3},{1, 2, 4},{1,
3, 4},{2, 3, 4}, and {1, 2, 3, 4} by Gams software
(Rosenthal 1988). Table 5 and Table 6 present the best
route of the CoMDVRP for each of two examples. More-
over, Fig. 3 illustrates the optimal solution of the examples
after the grand coalition (i.e. S15 = {1, 2, 3, 4}) and
demonstrates that each customer is allocated to which
depots. It also shows the best route among the depots and
customers in grand coalition. The main idea is that the total
transportation costs can be decreased if the players coop-
erate with each other. Table 7 summarizes values of the
objective function for each coalition obtained from the
CoMDVRP. This table also lists the cost saving for each
possible coalition obtained from Eq. (26) and synergy
obtained from Eq. (27).
Now, for a fair distribution of the cost saving among the
players, the techniques of CGT are utilized. In the next
section, some economic concepts are described for the cost
saving allocation.
Cooperative techniques for cost saving allocation
The cooperative techniques are used to fairly assign the
cost saving to each member of the coalition such that all
the players (owners) might receive more than they could
individually get on their own. The fair allocation is rec-
ognized according to the amount that is added by each
member to a coalition. Thus, depending on the amount that
each player adds to a coalition they receive a percent of
cost saving. A number of sharing mechanisms of cost
saving are suggested based on the economic models
including Shapley value, Core, the s value and ECSM.
Fig. 2 Examples of coalition between 4 companies
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The number of players (owners in CoMDVRP) is
denoted by n and the set of all the players is denoted by P
such that P = {1, 2,…, n}. A cooperative game is con-
sidered in which the players choose to cooperate in the
coalitions if they are profitable. A coalition is any subset
S ( P, and hence there are 2N - 1 possible coalitions. For
an N-person cooperative game among owners of
CoMDVRP, a characteristic function CS(S)is considered.
For owners set p, CS(P) represents the possible cost saving
when all owners cooperate (i.e., the characteristic function





CSð pf gÞ ð28Þ
A cost allocation vector y~¼ ðy1; y2; . . .; ynÞ assigns a
quantity yp to each player p in P and we know thatP
p2Pyp B CS(P). A vector y~¼ ðy1; y2; . . .; ynÞ is an
imputation for cost saving assignment if it satisfies the
individual rationality condition yp C CS({p}) for all
p 2 P, and efficient condition P p2Pyp = CS(P), respec-
tively (Barron 2013). Actually, an imputation shows that
how CS(P)should be distributed among the owners of VRP
system such that no one will reject the allocated assign-
ment. The set of all feasible imputations for the cooperative
game is defined as








The main challenge of CGT is to fairly assign the payoff
CS(P) among the players (Barron 2013). According to
different interpretations of the fairness, previous research-
ers have suggested various methods. In the following sec-
tions, we propose some of them for cost saving allocation
problem in the cooperative VRP, however, the readers may
Table 2 Travel costs (Cij) spent to go from point i to j for asymmetric
D1 D2 D3 D4 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16
D1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 3.00 2.69 1.80 1.12 1.80 3.81 3.16 2.50 1.12 3.20 5.15 4.03 4.24 4.61 4.12
D2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.06 3.35 2.55 1.00 0.71 2.92 2.50 1.80 1.00 1.41 1.41 4.61 3.54 3.35 4.53 4.72
D3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 1.80 0.71 1.00 2.55 2.55 2.06 1.80 2.24 1.41 1.00 2.69 1.58 1.80 2.55 3.20
D4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.35 1.12 1.00 2.55 4.00 2.83 3.20 3.20 3.81 2.55 2.12 1.80 1.00 2.06 1.00 2.06
C1 0.71 2.06 2.50 3.35 0.00 2.55 2.50 2.06 1.80 1.12 4.12 3.54 3.04 1.12 3.35 3.35 3.91 4.30 4.27 3.54
C2 3.00 3.35 1.80 1.12 2.55 0.00 1.12 2.50 3.64 1.80 4.27 4.03 3.50 2.06 2.69 2.92 2.06 3.00 1.80 1.41
C3 2.69 2.55 0.71 1.00 2.50 1.12 0.00 1.58 3.00 2.24 2.69 3.61 2.92 1.58 1.58 2.92 1.41 2.06 2.00 2.50
C4 1.80 1.00 1.00 2.55 2.06 2.06 1.58 0.00 1.58 2.55 2.06 1.50 1.41 1.00 1.41 3.64 2.55 2.50 3.54 3.91
C5 1.12 0.71 2.55 4.00 1.80 1.80 3.00 1.58 0.00 2.83 3.20 2.50 1.58 1.58 2.92 5.22 4.12 4.03 5.00 4.92
C6 1.80 2.92 2.55 2.83 1.12 1.12 2.24 2.55 2.83 0.00 4.50 4.03 3.81 1.58 3.54 4.30 3.61 4.27 3.61 2.50
C7 3.81 2.50 2.06 3.20 4.12 4.27 2.69 2.06 3.20 4.50 0.00 0.71 1.80 3.04 1.12 3.16 2.50 1.58 3.91 5.15
C8 3.16 1.80 1.80 3.20 3.54 3.54 3.61 1.50 2.50 4.03 0.71 0.00 1.12 2.50 1.12 3.54 2.69 2.00 4.03 5.00
C9 2.50 1.00 2.24 3.81 3.04 3.04 2.92 1.41 1.58 3.81 1.80 1.12 0.00 2.24 2.00 4.50 3.54 3.04 4.74 5.32
C10 1.12 1.41 1.41 2.55 1.12 1.12 1.58 1.00 1.58 1.58 3.04 2.50 2.24 0.00 2.24 4.03 2.92 3.20 3.54 3.35
C11 3.20 1.41 1.00 2.12 3.35 3.35 1.58 1.41 2.92 3.54 1.12 1.12 2.00 2.24 0.00 2.50 1.58 1.12 2.92 4.03
C12 5.15 4.61 2.69 1.80 3.35 5.00 2.92 3.64 5.22 4.30 3.16 3.54 4.50 4.03 2.50 0.00 1.12 1.58 1.50 3.54
C13 4.03 3.54 1.58 1.00 3.91 3.91 1.41 2.55 4.12 3.61 2.50 2.69 3.54 2.92 1.58 1.12 0.00 1.12 1.41 3.04
C14 4.24 3.35 1.80 2.06 4.30 4.30 2.06 2.50 4.03 4.27 1.58 2.00 3.04 3.20 1.12 1.58 1.12 0.00 2.50 4.12
C15 4.61 4.53 2.55 1.00 4.27 4.27 2.00 3.54 5.00 3.61 3.91 4.03 4.74 3.54 2.92 1.50 1.41 2.50 0.00 2.06
C16 4.12 4.72 3.20 2.06 3.54 3.54 2.50 3.91 4.92 2.50 5.15 5.00 5.32 3.35 4.03 3.54 3.04 4.12 2.06 0.00
Table 3 Demand of each customer for symmetric
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10
45 35 30 50 40 35 50 30 40 45
d11 d12 d13 d14 d15 d16 d17 d18 d19 d20
50 40 30 35 45 35 50 30 40 45
Table 4 Demand of each customer for asymmetric
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8
40 35 40 60 45 50 45 65
d9 d10 d11 d12 d13 d14 d15 d16
40 55 70 35 50 85 50 60
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refer to Barron (2013), Branzei et al. (2008), and Gilles
(2010) for more information.
Shapley value
The Shapley value is one of the solution methods for dis-
tribution of cost saving among the players (owners) that
was put forward by Shapley in 1952 (Shapley 1952).
Shapley value is a weighted average which considers
contributions of the marginal cost saving given by the
members in each possible coalition. An allocation y~¼





ð Sj j1Þ!ð Pj j Sj jÞ!
Pj j! CSðSÞCSðS pf gÞ½ ; ð30Þ
where Pi is the set of all coalitions S , Pthat contain
player p, and |S| represents the number of members in
coalition S, and |N| = n. CS(S) - CS(S - {p}) gives the
amount by which the cost saving of coalition S - {p}
Table 5 Best route for each vehicle in different coalitions for symmetric example
Coalition Route 1 Route 2 Route 3 Route 4
S1 = {1} D1–c1–c2–c3–c4–c5–D1 – – –
S2 = {2} – D2–c10–c9–c8–c7–c6–D2 – –
S3 = {3} – – D3–c15–c14–c13–c11–c12–D3 –
S4 = {4} – – – D4–c20–c19–c18–c17–c16–D4
S5 = {1, 2} D1–c6–c1–c7–c5–c8–D1 D2–c2–c10–c9–c3–c4–D2 – –
S6 = {1, 3} D1–c13–c1–c12–c2–c11–D1 – D3–c3–c15–c14–c5–c4–D3 –
S7 = {1, 4} D1–c19–c1–c18–c2–c17–D1 – – D4–c5–c20–c4–c3–c16–D4
S8 = {2, 3} – D2–c12–c11–c15–c14–c8–D2 D3–c9–c10–c7–c13–c6–D3 –
S9 = {2, 4} – D2–c18–c10–c9–c16–c17–D2 – D4–c8–c20–c6–c19–c7–D4
S10 = {3, 4} – – D3–c16–c15–c17–c18–c12–D3 D4–c14–c20–c13–c19–c11–D4
S11 = {1, 2, 3} D1–c6–c13–c7–c1–c12–D1 D2–c2–c10–c9–c3–c11–D2 D3–c15–c4–c8–c5–c14–D3 –
S12 = {1, 2, 4} D1–c19–c7–c1–c18–c11–D1 D2–c10–c9–c17–c3–c16–D2 – D4–c5–c8–c4–c20–c6–D4
S13 = {1, 3, 4} D1–c1–c12–c2–c18–c9–D1 – D3–c16–c3–c17–c15–c5–D3 D4–c14–c4–c20–c13–c19–D4
S14 = {2, 3, 4} – D2–c12–c18–c11–c10–c16–D2 D3–c9–c17–c15–c14–c8–D3 D4–c20–c7–c13–c6–c19–D4
S15 = {1, 2, 3, 4} D1–c19–c13–c6–c20–c17–D1 D2–c2–c18–c12–c1–c7–D2 D3–c16–c3–c9–c10–c11–D3 D4–c5–c8–c14–c15–c4–D4
Table 6 Best route for each vehicle in different coalitions for asymmetric example
Coalition Route 1 Route 2 Route 3 Route 4
S1 = {1} D1–c1–c5–c4–c3–c2–D1 – – –
S2 = {2} – D2–c9–c8–c7–c6–D2 – –
S3 = {3} – – D3–c10–c11–c13–c12–D3 –
S4 = {4} – – – D4–c14–c15–c16–D4
S5 = {1, 2} D1–c1–c6–c5–c9–c7–D1 D2–c8–c4–c3–c2–D2 – –
S6 = {1, 3} D1–c1–c10–c3–c13–c12–D1 – D3–c11–c4–c5–c2–D3 –
S7 = {1, 4} D1–c1–c5–c4–c3–c2–D1 – – D4–c16–c15–c14–D4
S8 = {2, 3} – D2–c11–c7–c13–c12–D2 D3–c8–c9–c10–c6–D3 –
S9 = {2, 4} – D2–c9–c8–c7–c6–D2 – D4–c14–c15–c16–D4
S10 = {3, 4} – – D3–c10–c11–c14–D3 D4–c13–c12–c15–c16–D4
S11 = {1, 2, 3} D1–c1–c10–c6–c2–c3–D1 D2–c5–c11–c13–c12–D2 D3–c4–c9–c8–c7–D3 –
S12 = {1, 2, 4} D1–c5–c1–c6–c2–c15–D1 D2–c9–c4–c3–c16–D2 – D4–c14–c7–c8–D4
S13 = {1, 3, 4} D1–c1–c10–c3–c14–D1 – D3–c11–c4–c5–c2–D3 D4–c13–c12–c15–c16–D4
S14 = {2, 3, 4} – D2–c11–c7–c14–D2 D3–c8–c9–c10–c6–D3 D4–c13–c12–c15–c16–D4
S15 = {1, 2, 3, 4} D1–c1–c11–c8–c7–D1 D2–c5–c9–c4–c10–D2 D3–c3–c13–c12–c14–D3 D4–c15–c16–c6–c2–D4
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increases when player p joins it. Therefore,
CS(S) - CS(S - {p}) represents the marginal cost saving
of participant p with respect to coalition S. The formula of
Shapley value denotes summation over all coalitions that
contain player p.
Core
Another very important concept in CGT is the core (Gillies
1953). For the cost saving allocation problem, the core of a
game presents a set of imputations as follows:
Fig. 3 Results of grand coalition in numerical examples
Table 7 Transportation cost
and cost saving for each
possible coalition
Coalition Symmetric example Asymmetric example
TC(Sm) CS(Sm) Synergy(Sm) TC(Sm) CS(Sm) Synergy(Sm)
S1 = {1} 15.684 0 0 6.79 0 0
S2 = {2} 15.398 0 0 7.33 0 0
S3 = {3} 14.472 0 0 6.35 0 0
S4 = {4} 15.684 0 0 6.62 0 0
S5 = {1, 2} 20.166 10.916 0.351 14.04 0.08 0.01
S6 = {1, 3} 18.601 11.555 0.383 11.73 1.41 0.11
S7 = {1, 4} 19.240 12.128 0.387 13.41 0 0
S8 = {2, 3} 19.896 9.974 0.334 12.89 0.79 0.06
S9 = {2, 4} 18.601 12.481 0.401 13.95 0 0
S10 = {3, 4} 20.402 9.754 0.258 10.45 2.52 0.10
S11 = {1, 2, 3} 25.877 19.677 0.432 16.22 4.25 0.21
S12 = {1, 2, 4} 26.009 20.757 0.444 17.8 2.94 0.14
S13 = {1, 3, 4} 26.349 19.491 0.425 16.94 2.82 0.14
S14 = {2, 3, 4} 26.349 19.205 0.421 16.53 3.77 0.19
S15 = {1, 2, 3, 4} 30.831 30.407 0.496 22.09 5 0.18
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coreð0Þ ¼ y!2 Y eðS; y!Þ 0; 8S  P 
¼ y!2 Y vðSÞ 
X
p2P




The game is called stable if the core is non-empty. The
core is the set of allocations so that each coalition receives
at least the cost saving associated with that coalition. The e-
core, for -?\ e\? ? is defined as follows:
coreðeÞ ¼ f y!2 Y j e ðS; y!Þ  e; 8S  P; S 6¼ P; S 6¼ ;g
ð32Þ
However, the core has two drawbacks: it can be not unique
and it can be empty. A relatively simple way to handle both
limitations is through least core (or minimax) core meth-
ods. Actually, the least core method shrinks the core space
simultaneously from each side of boundary until a single
point (imputation) is achieved. A linear model of the
minimax core is introduced as follows:
mine ð33Þ
Subject to:
eðS; y*Þ e; 8S  P ð34ÞX
p2P
yp ¼ vðPÞ ð35Þ
yp 0; 8p ð36Þ
s value
An extension of the Shapley value is based on the idea that
if there are a priori unions. The s value is defined as the
efficient imputation s, (i.e. ðs~2 YÞ) such that s~¼ mþ
aðM  mÞ for some a, where M and m denote the utopia
payoffs and the minimum rights vectors, respectively. m
and M are defined as follows:
mp ¼ max
Sm:p02Sm








Mp ¼ CSðPÞ  CSðPn pf gÞ ð38Þ
The s value is only defined for quasi balanced games. A
class of the quasi balanced games contains all games that
have a non-empty core (Casas-Me´ndez et al. 2003). s value
method defines imputation s~¼ ðs1; s2; . . .; snÞ such that:
sk ¼ mk þ aðMk  mkÞ; ð39Þ
in which a 2 [0, 1] is uniquely determined byP
p2Psp = CS(P).
Equal cost saving method
Equal cost saving method (ECSM) is motivated to provide
a stable and uniform allocation for the players. Actually,
this method minimizes the maximum differences in the
pairwise relative cost saving of the owners in a coalition.
The formulation of ECSM is as follows
Min z ð40Þ
Subject to:
z yp  yp0
 ; 8ðp; p0Þ 2 P; ð41ÞX
p2S
ypCSðSÞ; for all S  P; S 6¼ P; ð42Þ
X
p2P
yp ¼ CSðPÞ: ð43Þ
Constraint set (41) measures the maximum difference
between the relatives of each two players. Thus, variable
z represents the largest difference that should be minimized
in the objective function. Constraint sets (42) and (43)
ensure stability of the imputation.
Numerical example for cost saving methods
in cooperative VRP
As mentioned earlier, it is important how the total cost or
cost saving should be fairly distributed among the players.
CGT provides an appropriate framework to study the
problems of joint cost saving allocation. For the previous
numerical example, allocation of the cost saving according
to different CGT methods are shown in Table 8. The
Shapley value, and s value have been computed using
TUGlab (Mira´s Calvo and Sa´nchez Rodrı guez 2006).
Moreover the minimax core problem (33)–(36) and ECSM
problem (40)–(43) have been computed by Lingo 11.
Table 9 lists the corresponding satisfaction values for
each coalition. Consider imputation y~¼ ðy1; y2; . . .; ynÞ,
satisfaction of a coalition Sm from the imputation y
! is
computed by FsðCS; y!Þ ¼
P
p2Sm
yp  CSðSmÞ .FsðCS; y!Þ
represents the extra shares of allocated cost savings that
members of a coalition can obtain with respect to the cost
saving of the coalition.
Table 9 shows the satisfaction value for each coalition
in absolute terms and also the satisfaction value in relative
terms as a percentage of the satisfaction that are obtained
from the imputations, i.e. FsðCS; y!Þ

TCðSmÞ. Furthermore,
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Table 8 Allocation of cost
saving to VRP owners based on
different CGT methods
Coalition Symmetric example Asymmetric example
Shapley s value Maxmin core ECSM Shapley s value Maxmin core ECSM
S1 = {1} 7.9934 8.1576 7.8135 7.6017 0.9900 0.7372 1.0300 0.7500
S2 = {2} 7.6934 7.9149 8.0685 7.6017 1.2033 1.6872 1.1500 1.7300
S3 = {3} 6.9234 6.6056 7.1105 7.6017 1.8050 1.9428 2.0900 1.7700
S4 = {4} 7.7967 7.7289 7.4145 7.6017 1.0017 0.6328 0.7300 0.7500
Table 9 Coalition satisfactions from different CGT methods
Coalition Symmetric example Asymmetric example
Shapley s value Maximin core ECSM Shapley s value Maximin core ECSM
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minimum, maximum and the overall satisfaction of the
coalitions are indicated in this table.
Figure 4 illustrates the core of the four players game in
barycentric coordinates which are computed by TUGlab.
Note that only the cost savings allocated to the players 1, 2
and 3 are shown in this figure. The amount allocated to the
fourth player is implicit and can be computed from the
efficiency condition for each point.
To investigate the similarity between the four methods
of CGT, we suggest correlation between the cost saving
allocations. For two imputations y~¼ ðy1; y2; . . .; ynÞ and



















Table 10 illustrates the correlation measures for each
pair of CGT methods. From the table we know that the
solutions of Shapley value, s value, maximin core, and
ECSM are close in the symmetric example. However, in
asymmetric example, the solutions of different CGT
methods result in different solutions.
The following observation and managerial insights are
derived from the numerical examples:
1. Due to synergy effects of the owners, the cost saving of
coalition in a VRP can be considerable. For instance,
there are 49.6 and 18 % cost saving in the grand
coalition of symmetric and asymmetric examples that
could be regarded as a good motivation for the
cooperation among the companies.
2. Each player has a different role in the coalition. For
instance, in symmetric example, if owner 1 joins the
coalition {2, 3}, the cost savings would be 19.677, and
Fig. 4 Core of Co-MDVRP for examples with four players
Table 10 Similarity between solutions of CGT methods, measured by correlation
Coalition Symmetric example Asymmetric example
Shapley value s value Maxmin core ECSM Shapley value s value Maxmin core ECSM
Shapley value – 0.9797 0.9848 – – 0.8559 0.7977 0.7846
s value – – 0.9443 – – – 0.7384 0.9895
Maxmin core – – – – – – – 0.6443
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if he joins the coalition {2, 4}, then the cost savings
would be 20.757, and 19.491 if he joints the coalition
{3, 4}.
3. The results from various mechanisms of the CGT are
somewhat different. Therefore, these characteristics
must be considered in the contracts between companies
and as a result, the cost saving assigned to each player
can be thoroughly specified.
Conclusion and further research
This paper proposed a new vehicle routing problem for
minimizing the transportation costs when there are multiple
players (i.e. owners). Considering a multi-depot VRP, the
cooperation among owners of the depots was suggested by
sharing their vehicles. The transportation costs of collabo-
ration among different owners were evaluated. It was shown
that the transportation costs were decreased that could lead
to considerable cost savings. Hence, for a fair allocation of
the cost savings among the owners, a set of methods based
on the CGT theory including Shapley value, s value, least
core, and equal cost saving method were proposed. Two
symmetric and asymmetric examples were provided to
evaluate the proposed concept. Based on the results obtained
from the cost saving allocation, the owners can decide about
joining the coalitions that bring them more profit.
There are several directions and suggestions for future
research works. First of all, it was assumed that in the
MDVRP, the vehicles are similar. Changing this assump-
tion in the proposed MDVRP, can offer a new CoMDVRP.
Furthermore, other vehicle routing problems such as time
windows and etc. can be used to present a cooperative
model. Finally, this study assumes that the cost parameters
of the owners are common knowledge; however, it is
unlikely that the owners would be privy to real cost
parameters. This situation would lead to a collaborative
game model under asymmetric information that is inter-
esting but challenging.
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